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ABSTRACT
Web Application Firewalls are widely used in production envi-
ronments to mitigate security threats like SQL injections. Many
industrial products rely on signature-based techniques, but ma-
chine learning approaches are becoming more and more popular.
The main goal of an adversary is to craft semantically malicious
payloads to bypass the syntactic analysis performed by a WAF.
In this paper, we present WAF-A-MoLE, a tool that models the
presence of an adversary. This tool leverages on a set of muta-
tion operators that alter the syntax of a payload without affecting
the original semantics. We evaluate the performance of the tool
against existing WAFs, that we trained using our publicly available
SQL query dataset. We show that WAF-A-MoLE bypasses all the
considered machine learning based WAFs.
KEYWORDS
web application firewall, adversarial machine learning, sql injection,
mutational fuzzing
1 INTRODUCTION
Most security breaches occur due to the exploitation of some vulner-
abilities. Ideally, the best way to improve the security of a system
is to detect all its vulnerabilities and patch them. Unfortunately,
this is rarely feasible due to the extreme complexity of real systems
and high costs of a thorough assessment. In many contexts, pay-
loads arriving from the Internet are the primary threat, with the
attacker using them to discover and exploit some existing vulner-
abilities. Thus, protecting a system against malicious payloads is
crucial. Common protection mechanisms include input filtering,
sanitization, and other domain-specific techniques, e.g., prepared
statements. Implementing effective input policies is non trivial and,
sometimes, even infeasible (e.g., when a system must be integrated
in many heterogeneous contexts).
For this reason, mitigation solutions are often put in place. For
instance, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) aim to detect suspicious
activities. Clearly, these mechanisms have no effect on existing
vulnerabilities that silently persist in the system. However, when
IDSs can precisely identify intrusion attempts, they significantly
reduce the overall damage. The very core of any IDS is its detection
algorithm: the overall effectiveness only depends on whether it can
discriminate between harmful and harmless packets/flows.
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) are a prominent family of
IDS, widely adopted [16] to protect ICT infrastructures. Their de-
tection algorithm applies to HTTP requests, where they look for
1 admin ' OR 1=1#
2 admin ' OR 0X1=1 or 0x726 !=0 x726 OR 0x1Dd
not IN/*(seleCt 0X0)>c^Bj>N]*/ (( SeLeCT
476) ,(SELECT (SElEct 477)),0X1de) oR
8308 noT lIkE 8308\ x0c AnD truE OR '
FZ6/q' LiKE 'fz6/qI' anD TRUE anD '>U'
!= '>uz'#t'%'03;Nd
Figure 1: Two semantically equivalent payloads.
possible exploitation patterns, e.g., payloads carrying a SQL injec-
tion. Since WAFs work at application-level, they have to deal with
highly expressive languages such as SQL and HTML. Clearly, this
exacerbates the detection problem.
To clarify this aspect, consider a classical SQL injection scenario
where the attacker crafts a malicious payload x such that the query
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='x' AND pw='y' always suc-
ceeds (independently from y). Figure 1 shows two instances of such
a payload. Notice that the two payloads are semantically equivalent.
As a matter of fact, both reduce the above query to SELECT * FROM
users WHERE name='admin' OR ⊤ #. . . where ⊤ is a tautology
and . . . is a trail of commented characters. Ideally a WAF should
reject both these payloads. However, when classification is based on
a mere syntactical analysis, this might not happen. Hence, the goal
of an attacker amounts to looking for some malicious payload that
is undetected by theWAF. We present a technique to effectively and
efficiently generate such malicious payloads, that bypass ML-based
WAF. Our approach starts from a target malicious payload that
the WAF correctly detects. Then, by iteratively applying a set of
mutation operators, we generate new payloads. Since mutation op-
erators are semantics-preserving, the new payloads are equivalent
from the point of view of the adversary. However, they gradually re-
duce the confidence of theWAF classification algorithm. Eventually,
this process converges to a payload classified below the rejection
threshold. To evaluate the effectiveness of our methodology we
implemented a working prototype, called WAF-A-MoLE. Then we
applied WAF-A-MoLE to different ML-based WAFs, and evaluated
their robustness against our technique.
Contributions of the paper. The main contributions of this work
are summarized as follows: (i) we develop a tool for producing
adversarial examples against WAFs by leveraging on a set of syntac-
tical mutations, (ii) we produce a dataset of both sane and injection
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queries, (iii) and we review the state of the art of machine learning
SQL injection classifiers and we bypass them using WAF-A-MoLE.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) are commonly used to prevent
application-level exploits of web applications. Intuitively, the idea
is that a WAF can detect and drop dangerous HTTP requests to
mitigate potential vulnerabilities of web applications. The most
common detection mechanisms include signature-based matching
and classification via machine learning.
Signature-based WAFs identify a payload according to a list of
rules, typically written by some developers or maintained by a com-
munity. For instance, rules can be encoded through some policy
specification language that defines the syntax of legal/illegal pay-
loads. Nowadays, the signature-based approach is widely used and,
perhaps, the most popular signature-based WAF is ModSecurity1.
However, recently the machine learning-based approach has
received increasing attention. For instance, both FortiNet2 and
PaloAlto3 include ML-based detection in their WAF products, since
ML can overcome some limitations of signature-based WAFs, i.e.,
the extreme complexity of developing a list of syntactic rules that
precisely characterizes malicious payloads. Since ML WAFs are
trained on existing legal and illegal payloads, their configuration is
almost automatic.
Adversarial machine learning (AML) [6, 22] studies the threats
posed by an attacker aiming tomisleadmachine learning algorithms.
More specifically, here we are interested in evasion attacks, where
the adversary crafts malicious payloads that are wrongly classified
by the victim learning algorithm. The adversarial strategy varies
with the target ML algorithm. Many existing systems have been
shown to be vulnerable and several authors, e.g. [7, 10, 18, 32], pro-
posed techniques for systematically generating malicious samples.
Intuitively, the crafting process works by introducing a semantics-
preserving perturbation in the payload, that interferes with the
classification algorithms. Notice that, often, a formal semantics
of the classification domain is not available, e.g., it is informally
provided through an oracle such as a human classifier. The ob-
jective of the adversary may be written as a constrained mini-
mization problem x∗ = arg minx,C(x )D(f (x), ct ), where f is the
victim classifier, ct is the desired class the adversary wants to reach,
D is a distance function, and C(x) represents all the constraints
that cannot be violated during the search for adversarial examples.
Since we consider binary classifiers, we can rewrite our problem
as x∗ = arg minx,C(x ) f (x), where the output of f is bounded be-
tween 0 and 1, and we are interested in reaching the benign class
represented by 0.
3 OVERVIEW OFWAF-A-MOLE
Our methodology belongs to the class of guided mutational fuzz
testing approaches [17, 38]. Briefly, the idea is to start from a failing
test, that gets repeatedly transformed through the random appli-
cation of some predefined mutation operators. The modified tests,
1https://modsecurity.org
2https://www.fortinet.com/blog/business-and-technology/fortiweb-release-6-0--ai-
based-machine-learning-for-advanced-thr.html
3https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/detection-response
Figure 2: An outline of themutational fuzz testing approach.
input : Model m , Pay load p0 , Thre sho ld t
output : head (Q )
1 Q : = c r e a t e _ p r i o r i t y _ q u e u e ( )
2 v : = c l a s s i f y (m , p0 )
3 enqueue (Q , p0 , v )
4 while v > t
5 p : = mutate ( head (Q ) )
6 v : = c l a s s i f y (m , p )
7 enqueue (Q , p , v )
Figure 3: Core algorithm of WAF-A-MoLE.
called mutants, are then executed, compared (according to some
performance metric) and ordered. Then, the process is iterated
on the tests that performed better until a successful test is found.
Clearly, this approach requires both a comparison criterion and a set
of mutation operators. These are typically application-dependent.
Figure 2 schematically depicts this approach.
3.1 Algorithm description
In our context a test is a SQL injection and its execution amounts
to submitting it to the target WAF. The comparison is based on the
confidence value generated by the detection algorithm of the WAF.
The payload pool is the data structure containing the SQL injection
candidates to be mutated during the next round. Below we describe
in more detail the set of mutation operators and the payload pool.
A pseudo code implementation of the core algorithm of WAF-A-
MoLE is shown in Figure 3. The algorithm takes the learning model
m : X → [0, 1], where X is the feature space, an initial payload p0
and a threshold t , i.e., a confidence value under which a payload is
considered harmless. WAF-A-MoLE implements the payload pool
(see Section 3.3) as a priority queue Q (line 1). The payloads in Q
are prioritized according to the confidence value returned by the
classification algorithm, namely classify, associated tom. The clas-
sification algorithm assigns to each payload an x ∈ X, by extracting
a feature vector, and computesm(x).
Initially,Q only contains p0 (lines 2–3). The main loop (lines 4–7)
behaves as follows. The head element of Q , i.e., the payload having
the lowest confidence score, is extracted and mutated (line 5), by
applying a set of mutation operators (see Section 3.2). The obtained
payload, p, is finally classified (line 6) and en-queued (lines 7). The
2
Operator Short definition Example
Case Swapping CS(. . . a . . . B . . .) → . . .A . . .b . . . CS(admin' OR 1=1#) → ADmIn' oR 1=1#
Whitespace Substitution WS(. . .k1k2 . . .) → . . .k1 ␣ k2 . . . WS(admin' OR 1=1#) → admin'\n OR \t 1=1#
Comment Injection CI (. . .k1k2 . . .) → . . .k1/**/k2 . . . CI (admin' OR 1=1#) → admin'/**/OR 1=1#
Comment Rewriting CR(. . ./*s0*/. . .#s1) → . . ./*s ′0*/. . .#s ′1 CR(admin'/**/OR 1=1#) → admin'/*abc*/OR 1=1#xyz
Integer Encoding IE(. . .n . . .) → . . . 0x[n]16 IE(admin' OR 1=1#) → admin' OR 0x1=1#
Operator Swapping OS(. . . ⊕ . . .) → . . . ⊞ . . . (with ⊕ ≡ ⊞) OS(admin' OR 1=1#) → admin' OR 1 LIKE 1#
Logical Invariant LI (. . . e . . .) → . . . e AND ⊤ . . . LI (admin' OR 1=1#) → admin' OR 1=1 AND 2<>3#
Table 1: List of mutation operators.
termination of the algorithm occurs when a p receives a score less
or equal to the threshold t (line 4).
3.2 Mutation operators
A mutation operator is a function that changes the syntax of a
payload so that the semantics of the injected queries is preserved.
Below we describe the considered mutation operators.
CS. The Case Swapping operator randomly changes the capitaliza-
tion of the keywords in a query (e.g., Select to sELecT). Since SQL
is case insensitive, the semantics of the query is not affected.
WS.Whitespace Substitution relies on the equivalence between sev-
eral alternative characters that only act as separators (whitespaces)
between the query tokens. For instance, whitespaces include \n
(line feed), \r (carriage return) and \t (horizontal tab). Each of these
characters can be replaced by an arbitrary, non-empty sequence of
the others without altering the semantics of the query.
IC. Inline comments (/*...*/) can be arbitrarily inserted between
the tokens of a query. Since comments are not interpreted, they are
semantics preserving. The Comment Injection operator randomly
adds inline comments between the tokens.
CR. Following the above reasoning, the Comment Rewriting opera-
tor randomly modifies the content of a comment.
IE. The Integer Encoding operator modifies the representation of
numerical constants. This includes alternative base representations,
e.g., from decimal to hexadecimal, as well as statement nesting, e.g.,
(SELECT 42) is equivalent to 42.
OS. Some operators can be replaced by others that behave in the
same way. For instance, the behavior of = (equality check) can
be simulated by LIKE (pattern matching). We call this mutation
Operator Swapping.
LI. A Logical Invariant operator modifies a boolean expression by
adding opaque predicates.4
Table 1 provides a compact list, including a short, mnemonic
definition, of the operators described above.
3.3 Mutation tree
The priority queue of Figure 3 contains a sequential representation
ofmutation tree. Starting from a root element, i.e., the initial payload
(p0 in Figure 3), a mutation tree contains elements obtained through
the application of some mutation operator. A possible instance of
a mutation tree is shown in Figure 4. Each edge is labeled with
an identifier of the applied mutation operator. Also, each node is
4That is, heuristically generated true and false expressions to be combined in conjunc-
tion and disjunction (respectively) with the payload clauses.
labeled with a possible classification value (in percentage). The
corresponding queue is given by the sequence of the nodes in the
mutation tree ordered by the associated classification value.
After applying a mutation (actually after a full mutation round,
see Section 3.4), the payload is evaluated and added to the priority
queue, along with information about the payload that generated
it. Keeping all individuals in the initial population helps avoiding
local minima: when a payload is unable to create better payloads,
the algorithm tries to backtrack on old payloads to create a new
branch on the mutation tree.
3.4 Efficiency
The main bottleneck of our algorithm is the classification step.
Indeed, the classification of a payload requires the extraction of
a vector of features. Although a WAF classifier is efficient, the
feature extraction processmay require non-negligible string parsing
operations (see Section 4). For example, the procedure carried out
by a token-based classifier (see Section 4.2 for details) requires non-
trivial computation to parse the SQL query language (being context
free). Instead, all the mutation operators described in Section 3.2
rely on efficient string parsing, based on regular expressions.
We mitigate this issue by following a mutation preemption strat-
egy, i.e., we create a mutation round where multiple payloads are
generated at once. All these mutated payloads are stored for the
classification. Then we run all the classification steps in parallel
and we discharge the mutants that increase the classification value
of their parent. In this way we take advantage of the parallelization
support of modern CPUs.
For memory efficiency, we only enqueue a mutated payload if
it improves the classification value of its parent. In this way we
mitigate the potential, exponential blow-up of the mutation tree
(see Section 3.3). On the negative side, each branch of the mutation
tree only evolves monotonically whichmight result in the algorithm
stagnating on local minima. However, our experiments show that
this does not prevent our algorithm from finding an injectable
payload (see Section 5).
4 WAF TRAINING AND BENCHMARKING
Our technique applies to an input model representing a well-trained
WAF, i.e., a WAF that effectively detects malicious payloads. Ideally,
to generate a payload that bypasses a deployed WAF, the input
algorithm should rely on the same detection model. In the case of
ML-based WAF, the model is the result of the training process over
a sample dataset, while for signature-based WAFs the model is the
3
Figure 4: A possible mutation tree of an initial payload.
set of all the collected signatures that are used as a comparison for
future input data.
Unfortunately, it is very common that neither the detection
model nor the training dataset are publicly available. Reasonably,
this happens because the WAF manufacturers (correctly) consider
such knowledge an advantage for the adversary. Remarkably, this
also happens for the research prototypes.5 Thus, we had to create
a training dataset and configure the classification algorithms. The
following sections describe the issues we faced during this process
and how we solved them.
4.1 Dataset
To the best of our knowledge, no dataset of benign SQL queries is
publicly available. The main reason is probably that the notion of
“benign” is application-dependent and no universal definition exists.
On the other hand, there are many malicious payloads, that one
can extract from existing penetration testing tools such as sqlmap6
and OWASP ZAP7. We consider the payloads generated by these
tools, as any WAF should be trained on well-known attacks.
We built our dataset through an automatic procedure8. In par-
ticular, we used randgen9 to generate the queries. Starting from
a grammar G, the tool returns a set of queries that belong to the
language denoted by G. Noticeably, queries generated by randgen
also include actual values, e.g., table and column names, referring
to a given existing database. Thus, the queries in the dataset can be
submitted and evaluated against a real target.
To create our labeled dataset, we assume that SQL queries are
always created by the application when a user submits a payload,
either benign or malicious. To simulate this behavior, we generate
a single initial grammar that supports multiple query types. Then,
we provide different dictionaries of values for each terminal symbol
(i.e., t , f , v) that represents a possible value of a particular column
inside the database.
The query grammar is the following.
Q ::= S |U |D | I
S ::= SELECT ( f¯ | ∗) FROM t WHERE e [LIMIT v¯]
U ::= UPDATE t SET f = v WHERE e [LIMIT v¯]
D ::= DELETE FROM t WHERE e [LIMIT v¯]
I ::= INSERT INTO t ( f¯ ) VALUES (v¯)
e ::= f ⋛ v | f LIKE s | e AND e ′ | e OR e ′
Briefly, the queries Q can be select S , update U , delete D or insert
I . The syntax of each query is standard, only notice that S , U and
5All maintainers of the WAFs considered in this work were contacted, but no one
provided their datasets.
6https://github.com/sqlmapproject/sqlmap
7https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project
8The dataset is available at https://github.com/blindusername/wafamole-dataset
9https://github.com/MariaDB/randgen
D may optionally (square brackets) terminate with a LIMIT clause.
The queries operate on several parameter types, including fields f ,
tables t , values v , strings s and boolean expressions e, e ′. Finally,
we use ·¯ to denote a vector, i.e., a finite, comma-separated list of
elements. The actual values for t and f are taken from an actual
target database (this feature is provided by randgen). For v , we use
different values depending on the type of query we want to gener-
ate. For the benign queries, we generate payloads with a random
generator, a dictionary of nations, a dictionary of values which
are compatible with the field type to simulate a real application
payload. For example, in a database containing people names we
use English first and last names. We are interested in the structure
of the query, hence these values for the payload are suitable for our
analysis.
As mentioned above, the malicious values are generated by
sqlmap and OWASP ZAP.
4.2 Classification algorithms
Below we describe the classification algorithms that we used for
our experiments. In particular, we consider different techniques,
built on three feature extraction methods: characters, token and
graph based.
Character-based features. WAF-Brain10 is based on a recurrent-
neural network. The network divides the input query in blocks
of exactly five consecutive characters. Its goal is to predict the
sixth character of the sequence based on the previous five. If the
prediction is correct, the block of characters is more likely to be
part of a malicious payload. This process is repeated for every block
of five characters forming the target query.
The neural network of WAF-Brain is structured as follows. The
input layer is a Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [12] made of five neu-
rons, followed by two fully-connected layers, i.e., a dropout layer
followed by another fully connected layer. Finally, WAF-Brain com-
putes the average of all the prediction errors over the input query
and scores it as malicious if the result is above a fixed threshold
chosen a priori by the user. Since the threshold is not given by the
classifier itself, as all the other details of the training and cross-
validation phases, we set it to 0.5, which is the standard threshold
for classification tasks.
Token-based features. The token-based classifiers represent input
queries as histograms of symbols, namely tokens. A token is a
portion of the input that corresponds to some syntactic group, e.g.,
a keyword, comparison operators or literal values.
We took inspiration from the reviewwritten by Komiya et al. [28]
and Joshi et al [24] and we developed a tokenizer for producing
10https://github.com/BBVA/waf-brain
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C γ avд(A) σ
Token-based
Naive Bayes / / 54.2% 1.0%
Random Forest / / 87.3% 0.7%
Linear SVM 19.30 / 80.5% 1.4%
Gaussian SVM 278.25 0.013 93.1% 0.9%
SQLiGoT
Dir. Prop. 4.64 0.26 99.85% 0.07%
Undir. Prop. 2.15 0.71 99.10% 0.2%
Dir. Unprop. 2.15 0.26 99.74% 0.1%
Undir. Unprop. 2.15 0.26 98.89% 0.2%
Table 2: Training phase results.
the features vector to be used by these models. On top of that, we
implemented different models: (i) a Naive Bayes (NB) classifier, (ii)
a random forest (RF) classifier with an ensemble of 25 trees, (iii)
a linear SVM (L-SVM), and a gaussian SVM (G-SVM). We trained
them using a 5-fold cross-validation with 20,000 sane queries and
20,000 injections, and we used 15% of the queries for the validation
set. To this extent, we coded our experiment using scikit-learn [33],
which is a Python library containing already implemented machine
learning algorithms. After the feature extraction phase, the number
of samples dropped to 768 benign and 7,963 injection queries. The
tokenization method is basically an aggregation method: only a
subset of all symbols are taken into account. The dataset is unbal-
anced, as the variety of sane queries is outnumbered by the variety
of SQL injections. To address this issue, we set up scikit-learn ac-
cordingly, by using a loss function that takes into account the class
imbalance [9]. Table 2 shows the results of the training phase where
(i) C is the regularization parameter [36] that controls the stability
of the solution, (ii) γ is the kernel parameter (only for the gaussian
SVM) [1, 21], and (iii) avд(A) and σ are the average and standard
deviation of the accuracy computed during the cross-validation
phase over the validation set.
Graph-based features. Kar et al. [25] developed SQLiGoT, an SQL
injection detector that represents a SQL query as a graph, both
directed and undirected. Each node in this graph is a token of
the SQL language, plus all system reserved and user defined table
names, variables, procedures, views and column names. Moreover,
the edges are weighted uniformly or proportionally to the distances
in terms of adjacency. We omit all the details of the model, as
they are well described in the paper. Kar et al. released the hyper-
parameter they found on their dataset, but since both C and γ
depend on data, we had to train these models from scratch.
We performed a 10-fold cross-validation for SQLiGoT, using
20,000 benign and 20,000 malicious queries, again using the scikit-
learn library. After the feature extraction phase, the dataset is
shrunk to: (i) 3216 sane 12,659 and malicious data for the directed
graph versions, (ii) and 3268 sane 12,682 and malicious data for the
undirected graph versions of SQLiGoT. Again, many queries possess
the same structure as others, and this is likely to happen for sane
queries. As already said in the previous paragraph, we are dealing
with imbalance between the two classes, and we treat this issue by
using a balanced accuracy loss function, provided by the scikit-learn
framework. Table 2 shows the result of the training phase of the
A R P
ModSecurity CSR
Paranoia 1/2 86.10% 86.10% 100%
Paranoia 3/4 91.85% 91.85% 100%
Paranoia 5 96.46% 96.46% 100%
WAF-Brain RNN 98.27% 96.73 99.8%
Token-based
Naive Bayes 50.16% 98.71% 50.08%
Random forest 98.33% 98.33% 100%
Linear SVM 98.75% 98.76% 100%
Gaussian SVM 97.82% 97.82% 100%
SQLiGoT
Dir. Prop. 90.61% 97.30% 85.82%
Undir. Prop. 96.38% 97.31% 95.54%
Dir. Unprop. 90.52% 97.12% 85.80%
Undir. Unprop. 96.25% 97.05% 95.53%
Table 3: Benchmark table.
different SQLiGoT classifiers. Both the hyper-parameters and the
scores are almost the same for all the different versions of SQLiGoT.
4.3 Benchmark
We carried out benchmark experiments to assess the detection rates
of the classifiers discussed above. For all the classifiers used for this
benchmark, we formed a dataset of 8,000 sane queries and 8,000
SQL injection queries, and we classified them using the models we
have trained. Table 3 shows the results of our experiment.
We evaluated the performance of each classifier by accounting
three different metrics: (i) accuracy, (ii) recall, and (iii) precision.
We denote the true positives as TP , true negatives as TN , false
positives as FP and false negatives as FN . Accuracy is computed
as A = T P+T NT P+T N+F P+FN , recall is computed as R =
T P
T P+FN and
precision is computed as P = T PT P+F P . The accuracy measures how
many samples have been correctly classified, i.e., a sane query
classified as sane or an injected query classified as malicious. The
recall measures how good the classifier is at identifying samples
from the relevant class, in this case the injection payloads. Scoring
a high recall value means that the classifier labeled most of the real
positives in the dataset as positives. The precision measures how
many of the samples classified as relevant are actually relevant.
Since the Naive Bayes algorithm tries to discriminate between
input classes by considering each variable independent one to an-
other, it misses the real structure of the SQL syntax. Hence, it cannot
properly capture the complexity of the problem. All other classi-
fiers may be compared with different levels of paranoia offered
by ModSecurity, showing their effectiveness as WAFs. WAF-Brain
results are comparable to what the author claims on his GitHub
repository.
5 EVADING MACHINE LEARNINGWAFS
In this section, we experimentally assess WAF-A-MoLE against the
classifiers introduced above. The experiments were performed on a
DigitalOcean11 droplet VM with 6 CPUs and 16GB of RAM. For a
baseline comparison we used an unguided mutational fuzzer. The
11https://www.digitalocean.com/
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Figure 5: Guided (solid) vs. unguided (dotted) search strategies applied to initial payload admin’ OR 1=1#.
unguided fuzzer randomly applies the mutation operators of Sec-
tion 3.2. Moreover, we executed 100 instances of the unguided fuzzer
on each classifier. Then, we compared a single run of WAF-A-MoLE
against the best payload generated by the 100 unguided instances
over time. Both the WAF-A-MoLE and the unguided fuzzers were
configured to start from the payload admin' OR 1=1#, initially
detected with 100% confidence by each classifier.
5.1 Assessment results
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the confidence score for each clas-
sifier. In each plot, we compare the best sample obtained by WAF-
A-MoLE (solid line) and the best sample generated by all the 100
processes of the unguided fuzzer (dashed line).
The first group of plots (left) show the evolution of the confi-
dence scores against the number of mutation rounds. The second
group (right), shows the confidence score over the actual time of
computation. In particular, we show the first 10 seconds of compu-
tation. Since some scores quickly degrade in the first milliseconds
of computation, we report the x axis in log scale.
5.2 Interpretation of the results
Our experiments highlight a few facts that we discuss below.
Feature choice matters. As explained in Section 4.2, all the consid-
ered classifiers are based on syntactic features. However, different
feature set change the robustness of a classifier. For instance, WAF-
Brain quickly lost confidence when the payload mutated, because
WAF-Brain is trained from uninterpreted, fixed-length sequences
of characters and our mutation operators can enlarge a payload
beyond the adequacy of the length assumed by WAF-Brain. Also
Token-based classifiers do not perform well against mutations. The
reason is that malicious and benign payloads overlap in the feature
space. All SQLiGoT versions showed to be robust against the un-
guided approach. These classifiers use the SVM algorithm as some
of the token based classifiers, but their feature set imposes more
structure inside the feature representation. Hence, random muta-
tions have a negligible probability to evade them. Instead, since
WAF-A-MoLE relies on a guided strategy, it can effectively craft
adversarial examples (although more effort is needed).
Finding adversarial examples is non-trivial. SQLiGoT classifiers
resist the unguided evaluation as it is unlikely that a mutation can
move the sample away from a plateau region where the confidence
of being a SQL injection is high. The main reasons are: (i) SQLiGoT
considered a large number of tokens (so reducing the collision
problem that affects other classifiers, since the compression factor
applied by the feature extractor is lower); (ii) The structure of the
feature vector is inherently redundant, i.e., each pair of adjacent
variables describe the same token; (iii) the models are regularized,
hence the decision function is smoother between input points and
it manages to generalize over new samples.
WAF-A-MoLE effectively evades WAFs. Moving randomly in the
input space is not an effective strategy. WAF-A-MoLE finds adver-
sarial samples by leveraging on hints given by classifier outputs.
The guided approach accomplishes what the unguided approach
failed to, by moving points away from plateaus and putting them
in regions of low confidence of being recognized as SQL injection.
Moreover, among the SQLiGoT classifiers, the undirected unpro-
portional is the most resilient variant. Recalling the definition of
the algorithm [25], the feature extractor assigns uniform weights
to tokens in the same window instead of balancing the score w.r.t.
the distance of the current token. Hence, the classifier gains some
invariance over the sequence of extracted tokens, making it more
robust to adversarial noise.
5.3 Discussion and limitations
Our experiments show that, starting from a target malicious pay-
loads, WAF-A-MoLE effectively degrades the confidence scores of
the considered classifiers. In this section we discuss implications
and limitations of this result.
Generality of the experiments. As discussed in Section 4.1, the
classifiers were trained with a dataset that we had to build from
scratch. This has clear consequences on our experimental results.
Hence, to extend the validity of our results, new experiments should
be executed from other, real-world, datasets.
Another limitation is that we did not take into account the ro-
bustness of WAFs combining signatures and ML techniques, called
hybrid. These systems are becoming more and more common.
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Adversarial attacks mitigation. Demontis et al. [15] showed the
effect of the presence of regularization when a classifier is under
attack. Without regularization an attacker may craft an adversarial
example against the target, due to the high irregularity of the victim
function. Adding the regularization parameter has the effect of
smoothing the decision boundary of the function between samples,
reducing the amount of local minima and maxima. On top of that,
the adversary needs to increase the amount of perturbations to craft
adversarial examples. All models we trained have been properly
regularized.
Grosse et al. [19] propose the so called adversarial training, that
basically is a re-fit of the classifier also including the attack points.
This defense system leads to better robustness against adversarial
examples, at the cost of worse accuracy scores. Again, as shown by
Carlini et al. [10] this is not a solution, but it may slow down the
adversary in finding adversarial examples.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present some work related to WAFs, as well as
evasion techniques that have been proposed to bypass them.
Attacks against signature-based WAFs: Appelt et al. [3, 4] pro-
pose a technique to bypass signature-based WAFs. Their technique
is a search-based approach in which they create new payloads
from existing blocked payloads. The problem with implementing a
search-based approach in this context is hard: the obvious evalu-
ation function for a payload against the target WAF is a decision
function with values PASSED/BLOCKED. Search-based approaches
perform poorly if the evaluation function has many plateaus. To
mitigate this issue, the authors propose an approximate evaluation
function which returns the probability of a payload of being “near”
the PASSED or BLOCKED state. In the best case scenario, this func-
tion smooths the plateau and the search algorithm converges to
the PASSED state.
Automata based WAFs: Halfond et al. [20] propose AMNESIA,
a tool to detect and prevent SQL injection attacks. The algorithm
works by creating a Non-Deterministic Finite Automa representing
all the SQL queries that the application can generate. The main
issues with this approach are that an attack can bypass it (i) if
the model is too conservative and includes queries that cannot
be generated by the application or (ii) if the attack has the same
structure of a query generated by the application. Bandhakavi et
al. [5] developed CANDID, a tool that detects SQL injection attempts
via candidate selection. This approach consists of transforming
queries into a canonical form and evaluating each incoming query
against candidate ones generated by the application.
Machine learning WAFs: Ceccato et al. [11] propose a clustering
method for detecting SQL injection attacks against a victim service.
The algorithm learns from the queries that are processed inside the
web application under analysis, using an unsupervised one-class
learning approach, namely K-medoids [26]. New samples are com-
pared to the closest medoid and flagged as malicious if their edit
distance w.r.t. the chosen medoid is higher than the diameter of the
cluster. Kar et al. [25] develop SQLiGoT, a support vector machine
classifier (SVM) [13] that expresses queries as graphs of tokens,
whose edges represent the adjacency of SQL-tokens. This is the
classifier we used in our analysis. Pinzon et al. [34] explore two
directions: visualization and detection, achieved by a multi-agent
system called idMAS-SQL. To tackle the task of detecting SQL in-
jection attacks, the authors set up two different classifiers, namely
a Neural Network and an SVM. Makiou et al. [29] developed an
hybrid approach that uses both machine learning techniques and
pattern matching against a known dataset of attacks. The learning
algorithm used for detecting injections is a Naive Bayes [30]. They
look for 45 different tokens inside the input query, chosen by do-
main experts. Similarly, Joshi et al. [24] use a Naive Bayes classifier
that, given a SQL query as input, extracts syntactic tokens using
spaces as separator. The algorithm produces a feature vector that
counts how many instances of a particular word occurs in the input
query. The vocabulary of all the possible observable tokens is set
a priori. Komiya et al. [28] propose a survey of different machine
learning algorithms for SQL injection attack detection.
Evading machine learning classifiers: The techniques that are
used in the state of the art are divided in two different categories:
(i) gradient and (ii) black-box methods. For a comprehensive ex-
planation of these techniques, Biggio et al.[8] expose the state of
the art of adversarial machine learning in detail. The attacker can
compute the gradient of the victim classifier w.r.t. the input they
use to test the classifier. Biggio et al.[7] propose a technique for
finding adversarial examples against both linear and non linear
classifiers, by leveraging on the information given by the gradient
of the target model. Similarly, Goodfellow et al.[18] present Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), which is used to perturb images to
shift the confidence of the real class towards another one. Papernot
et al. [32] propose an attack that computes the best two features to
perturb in order to most increase the confidence of it belonging to
a certain class. This method leverages on gradient information too.
If the attacker has information regarding a particular system, but
they can not access it, they can try to learn a surrogate classifier,
as proposed by Papernot et al.[31]. Many papers that craft attacks
in other domains [14, 27, 35] belong to this category. If the attacker
does not have access to the model, or they have no information
on how to reconstruct it locally, they treat this case as a black-box
optimization problem. Ilyas et al. [23] apply an evolution strategy
to limit the number of queries that are sent to the victim model
to craft an adversarial example. Xu et al. [37] propose a technique
that uses a genetic algorithm for crafting adversarial examples that
bypass PDF malware classifiers. Anderson et al. [2] evade different
malware detectors by altering malware samples using semantics
invariant transformations, by leveraging only on the score provided
by the victim classifier.
7 CONCLUSION
We provided experimental evidence that machine learning based
WAFs can be evaded. Our technique takes advantage of an adver-
sarial approach to craft malicious payloads that are classified as
benign. Moreover, we showed that WAF-A-MoLE efficiently con-
verges to bypassing payloads. We show the results of this technique
applied to existing WAFs, both via a guided and unguided approach.
We leveraged on a set of syntactic mutations that do not alter the
original semantics of the input query. Finally, we built a dataset of
SQL queries and we released it publicly.
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Our work highlights that machine learning based WAFs are
exposed to a concrete risk of being bypassed. Future directions
include testing WAFs based on other techniques such as hybrid
ones, finding new mutations to improve our approach, and take
advantage of our adversarial technique to improve detection of
malicious payloads.
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